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I. Criminal Procedure Code
The first section of this chapter examines the constitutional framework wit-
hin which the laws on criminal procedure in Switzerland operate (1.) and gives 
a brief history of criminal procedural laws in Switzerland, before embarking 
on an examination of the key developments en route to the eventual codifi-
cation of the unified Swiss Criminal Procedure Code in 2011 (2.). Finally, the 
CƺƢƣ’ƾ lƞǄƺǀƿ ƞƹƢ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƞƹƞlǄƾƣƢèᄬᇵ.ᄭ. 
ᇳ. Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ Fإؔؠؘتآإ؞
Switzerland is a federal republic. All competencies that are not vested in the 
ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƞƽƣ ƣǃƣƽơiƾƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ.1 Criminal 
law and criminal procedure were traditionally a key legislative area for the 
cantons: neither the Constitution of 1848 nor the one of 1874 provided for 
centralised legislative powers. However, towards the end of the 19th century 
pressure mounted on parliament to draw up a criminal code to deal with the 
ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƺƤƤƣƹơƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƞll ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. Oƹ ᇳᇵ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇺᇻᇺ, 
the confederation became entitled to legislate in the field of substantive cri-
minal law.2 
From this point, it would be a further 102 years before the confederation 
finally obtained the power to legislate in the field of criminal procedure. 
Throughout the 20th century, there were more than 50 different codes of crimi-
nal procedure applicable in Switzerland: 26 cantonal codes of criminal proce-
Ƣǀƽƣ, ᇴᇸ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƽƣƨǀlƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ Jǀǁƣƹilƣ Jǀƾƿiơƣ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ơƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇻᇵᇶ 
on Federal Criminal Justice, the administrative criminal procedure code of 
1974, and the criminal procedure code of the Swiss Military in 1979. This vari-
ety of procedural rules proved to be extremely inefficient in practical terms: 
1 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ-dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
2 Fƺƽ Ƣƣƿƞilƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƣƹƞơƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇳ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇵᇹ, dc ᇵᇳᇳ.ᇲ, 
ƾƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇸᇻ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl 
Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/4QS4-CWQ5). 
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for example, it made the prosecution of interstate and transnational (organi-
sed) crime very difficult. Further, many of the existing procedural codes stood 
increasingly at odds with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. At the turn of the millennium, it 
was clear to everyone that criminal procedural law needed to be standardised 
on a national level. The reform of the Swiss Justice System was put to popular 
vote and approved in a landslide victory on 12 March 2000.ᇵ This cleared the 
way for the drafting of Swiss criminal and civil procedure codes.
Before embarking on a discussion of the legislative process leading to the 
adoption of a unified code of criminal procedure, it should be noted that 
despite such a development, there are three domains the cantons retain full 
responsibility. These areas are the organisation of the courts, the administra-
tion of justice in criminal cases and the execution of sentences and measures 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇴᇵ II Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. FiƽƾƿlǄ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƽƣƸƞiƹ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƣƾƿƞ-
blishing their own court system. For example, they can decide whether they 
want district courts to be responsible for settling criminal and civil cases for 
a specific area (as is the case in the canton of Zurich) or a cantonal crimi-
nal court with an exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters (as is the case 
in Lucerne and Basel Stadt). They can also set up rules on the eligibility of 
judges. For example, federal law does not preclude the existence of lay jud-
ges.4 This means that cantons retain the power to allow laymen on the bench: 
many cantons do so, although Zurich has recently banned them. Regarding 
the regulation of juries, the federal rules on the main hearings at court do 
not contain provisions on jury selection and/or instruction. Thus, trial by 
jury, which used to be quite widespread, is almost entirely excluded today.5 
NƣǁƣƽƿƩƣlƣƾƾ, ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ eiơiƹƺ ƾƿill ơƺƹƿiƹǀƣƾ ƿƺ ƩƺlƢ jǀƽǄ ƿƽiƞlƾ. FǀƽƿƩƣƽ, 
the cantons can decide whether they want to allow the publication of dissen-
ting opinions. 
Secondly, the administration of criminal justice lies in the hands of the 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ: ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇳ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇵᇹ iƾ ƞƹ ƞơƿ ƺƤ 
the federal parliament, it is administered by cantonal courts. There are only 
ᇵ 86.4 % of the voters and all cantons approved the reform. The turnout was at 42 %.
4 Nؔؗ؜ءؘ kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, Nƞƿiƺƹƞl ơƩƞƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƿiơƾ, ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ, ƞƹƢ ƩiƾƿƺƽǄ ƺƤ 
criminal law in Switzerland, in Ulrich Sieber/Konstanze Jarvers/Emily Silverman (eds.), 
Nƞƿiƺƹƞl CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ iƹ ƞ CƺƸƻƞƽƞƿiǁƣ Lƣƨƞl Cƺƹƿƣǃƿ, gƺl ᇳ.ᇳ, Bƣƽliƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇵ, ƻƻ. ᇴᇲᇷ, ƻ. ᇴᇴᇳ.
5 “A jury is not explicitly prohibited but is probably inadmissible due to a lack of provisions 
governing the division of tasks within the court and a lack of special procedural provisions”, 
kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 221.
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a handful of very serious crimes6 against national interests prosecuted by the 
Attorney General of Switzerland and tried by the Federal Criminal Court in 
Bellinzona. 
Finally, the cantons are mainly responsible for the execution of the (dual) 
system of sanctions:7 in the executing of sentences, the cantons have to provide 
penitentiary institutions, a system for the collection of monetary penalties 
and fines, and probation offices. For the execution of measures, the cantons 
must install suitable institutions to treat those with addictions and mental 
ƢƣƤiơiƣƹơiƣƾ. IƹƢƣƤiƹiƿƣ iƹơƞƽơƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ƣǃƣơǀƿƣƢ iƹ ƩiƨƩ-ƾƣơǀƽiƿǄ ƾƣơ-
tions of regular prisons. Such a penitentiary system is too expensive for every 
canton to be expected to individually create one. The cantons have therefore 
united their efforts in several inter-cantonal agreements (“concordats”8).
ᇴ. Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
As mentioned, by the end of the 20th century it was becoming increasingly 
clear that there was a need to standardise criminal procedure in Switzerland. 
Thus, in 1994, a commission of experts was established with the set purpose 
ƺƤ ƣǃƻlƺƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾƾiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ơƽƣƞƿiƹƨ ƞ ǀƹiƤiƣƢ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ. Iƹ ᇳᇻᇻᇹ 
they produced their completed report, entitled “From 29 to 1”. They proposed 
to unify 29 of the existing criminal justice codes for adults (26 cantonal crimi-
nal codes of procedure, the procedural code on Federal Criminal Justice and 
the administrative and military criminal codes of procedure) in one federal 
code of criminal Procedure. The commission decided to postpone the unifica-
tion of procedural legislation on Juvenile Justice for the time-being. 
Iƹ ᇳᇻᇻᇻ, ƺƹƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƟƿƞiƹƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƺǂƣƽ ƿƺ ƽƣƨǀ-
late criminal procedure on a national level, the Federal Council mandated 
N؜؞؟ؔبئ dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, professor of criminal law at the University of Zurich, to 
draw up a Federal Code of Criminal Procedure.9 The commission’s idea of 
6 Fƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸƣƾ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ƾƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇵ ƞƹƢ ᇴᇶ CƽiƸiƹƞl aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ CƺƢƣ
7 dƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, ƻƻ. ᇵᇹᇹ.
8 See the chapter on Constitutional Law, p. ᇵᇻᇻ.
9 Iƹ ƢƣƤiƞƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƸiƾƾiƺƹ’ƾ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƣƢ ƻƺƾƿƻƺƹƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ iƾƾǀƣ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Council also decided to proceed with unifying the codes on Juvenile Justice. Thus, the 
aƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Jǀǁƣƹilƣ Jǀƾƿiơƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ gƞlƞiƾ, Jؘؔء kؘإؠؔااؘء, was commissioned to 
draft a Swiss Juvenile Justice code. 
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integrating the administrative and military criminal procedure codes was 
overruled. 
FƽƺƸ ᇴᇲᇲᇳᅬᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƿƩƣ ƿǂƺ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƢƽƞƤƿƾ ǂƣƽƣ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƞ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl 
ơƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ Cƺƹƾǀlƿƞƿiƺƹ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ éơƿᄭ.10 Almost ever-
yone welcomed the idea of unification. The most controversial issue was that 
of who should be in charge of the preliminary proceedings: should it be the 
sole responsibility of the prosecutor or should it also involve investigative jud-
ƨƣƾ ƺƽ Ƹƞƨiƾƿƽƞƿƣƾ? Iƹ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƩiƾ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ iƾƾǀƣ, ƿƩƣ GƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ ƻƽƺ-
posed in its dispatch11 of 21 December 2005 that the Federal Assembly should 
introduce a purely prosecutorial system, meaning that the preliminary pro-
ceedings would indeed be the sole responsibility of the prosecutor’s office. 
This proposal was followed by Parliament. Subsequently, after less than one 
year of debates Parliament passed the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code on 5 
OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ. Iƿ ƣƹƿƣƽƣƢ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇳ.12
The nationwide standardisation of criminal procedure under the Swiss 
Criminal Procedure Code of 2011 was an important step in the right direction 
in many ways. For defence counsels, it has become a lot easier to represent 
defendants in other cantons. They now only have to be familiar with one, 
unified law of criminal procedure. This means a better standard of represen-
tation for accused persons; their interests will be better protected. The unifi-
cation has also sparked a national academic debate about different aspects of 
Swiss criminal procedure. Before the unification, hardly anything was publis-
hed on cantonal procedure codes, meaning that lawyers and judges looking 
for an answer to a particular legal problem would not have much literature to 
rely on. This seriously hindered discussion of the topic, which to some extent 
hindered progress or change, although the Supreme Court was making great 
efforts to introduce progressive measures into the cantonal procedure codes. 
Still, today there remains much room for progress. The organisation of 
the criminal justice authorities and the execution of sanctions, which are 
10 Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure of 18 March 2005 (Consultation Procedure 
Act, CPA), SR 172.061; see for an English version of the Consultation Procedure Act www.
admin.ch (https://perma.cc/6MCM-KXYG); see for legislative procedure the Chapter 
Swiss Legal System, pp. 27.
11 The term “dispatch” (German: Botschaft; French: message) is the term used by the Swiss 
government for explanatory reports to draft legislation; resembling a White Paper in the 
UK; see Chapter Swiss Legal System p. 28.
12 The Swiss Juvenile Criminal Procedure Code was adopted on 20 March 2009 and entered 
iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇳ ᄬdc ᇵᇳᇴ.ᇳᄭ.
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currently still areas in which the cantons have exclusive competence, need to 
be harmonised on a national level. The administrative and military criminal 
codes are out-dated, too; it is unfortunate that the Federal Council dropped 
the idea of standardising these back at the turn of the millennium. 
The two biggest contemporary challenges in terms of legislation on crimi-
nal procedure, however, lie outside the subject’s traditional realm. Firstly, 
with the threat of terrorism constantly evolving and increasing, one key 
challenge is the need to bring police and secret service legislation (both on 
a cantonal and federal level) in line with criminal procedure legislation. For 
example, can information from police-intercepted phone calls be handed 
over to the criminal justice authorities, considering the fact that such infor-
mation may have been intercepted before there was any adequate level of 
suspicion against a person? Secondly, administrative laws provide for many 
sanctions that have traditionally not been regarded as criminal penalties: 
for example, federal agencies can ban bank managers from their profession 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵ Fiƹƞƹơiƞl Mƞƽkƣƿ dǀƻƣƽǁiƾiƺƹ éơƿᄭᇳᇵ or close down pharmaceutical 
firms (Article 66 Therapeutic Products Act).14 These sanctions clearly meet 
the standard of ‘criminal charges’ as assessed in case law dealing with Article 
ᇸ I ECHc.15 Hence, the procedures which lead to these sanctions being impo-
sed must also meet criminal procedure standards (e.g. nemo tenetur).16 
ᇳᇵ Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority of 22 June 2007 
ᄬFiƹƞƹơiƞl Mƞƽkƣƿ dǀƻƣƽǁiƾiƺƹ éơƿ, FINMédéᄭ, dc ᇻᇷᇸ.ᇳ ᄬ“[1.] If the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority (FINMA) detects a serious violation of supervisory provisions, it may 
prohibit the person responsible from acting in a management capacity at any person or 
entity subject to its supervision. [2.] The prohibition from practising a profession may be 
imposed for a period of up to five years.”). 
14 Federal Act on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices of 15 December 2000 (Thera-
peutic Products Act, TPA), SR 812.21 („[1.] The Agency may take all administrative meas-
ures necessary to enforce this Act. 2 In particular it may: c. close down establishments.“).
15 Iƹ ƞƾƾƣƾƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƞƾƻƣơƿ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ ECHc, ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ Eƹƨƣl 
ƞƹƢ OƿƩƣƽƾ ǁ. ƿƩƣ NƣƿƩƣƽlƞƹƢƾ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇷᇳᇲᇲ/ᇹᇳ, ᇷᇳᇲᇳ/ᇹᇳ, ᇷᇳᇲᇴ/ᇹᇳ, ᇷᇵᇷᇶ/ᇹᇴ ƞƹƢ ᇷᇵᇹᇲ/ᇹᇴ, 
ECƿHc ᇺ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇹᇸ, ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƾ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ơƽiƿƣƽiƞ ƞƿ ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇺᇴᅬᇺᇵ: ƿƩƣ ơlƞƾƾiƤiơƞ-
tion of the act in domestic law; the nature of the offence; and the severity of the penalty 
that the person concerned risks incurring. The first criteria is only a starting-point for 
ƿƩƣ Cƺǀƽƿ’ƾ ƣǃƞƸiƹƞƿiƺƹè ᅬ ƣǁƣƹ iƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ơlƞƾƾiƤiƣƢ ƞƾ ơƽiƸiƹƞl iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƣƺ-
mestic law, the Court will still delve behind this classification to examine the actual 
substance of the offence and make its own independent assessment. 
16 For „nemo tenetur“ see pp. 412.
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ᇵ. Cآءاؘءا17
The Swiss Criminal Procedure Code contains 457 Articles. They are divided 
up into 12 parts. The Swiss Juvenile Criminal Procedure Code has roughly 
ƿƩƣ ƾƞƸƣ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣ Ɵǀƿ iƾ ƸǀơƩ ƾƩƺƽƿƣƽ ᄬᇷᇶ éƽƿiơlƣƾᄭ. Iƿ iƾ ơƺƹơƣƻƿǀƞliƾƣƢ ƞƾ 
a lex specialis: if a specific problem is not regulated in the Juvenile Criminal 
Procedure Code, the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure applies. 
Part 1 (Articles 1–11) regulates basic principles of criminal procedure such as 
fairness, independence, speediness, ex officio investigation, mandatory pro-
secution and prosecutorial discretion, presumption of innocence, in dubio 
pro reo, or double jeopardy. 
Part 2 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇴᅬᇳᇲᇵᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ criminal justice authorities (police, 
prosecution, and courts). As mentioned, the legislator decided to establish 
a prosecutorial system. The preliminary proceedings are there fore led solely 
by the prosecutor (Article 61 lit. a). There is no (independent) investigative
 
Figure 1: Criminal Procedure Laws
17 Iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƿƣǃƿ, ǂƩƣƽƣ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơiƹƨ ƿƩƣiƽ ƾƺǀƽơƣ ƺƤ 
law, they are located in the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code of 5 October 2007 (Criminal 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ CƺƢƣ, CƽiƸaCᄭ, dc ᇵᇳᇴ.ᇲ; ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ CƽiƸiƹƞl aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ 
Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.cc/6S55–6MBC).
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judge or magistrate in charge of the proceedings. Some intrusive investigative 
measures, such as detention on remand or wire-tapping of phones, have to be 
ordered or approved by a judge at the “compulsory measures court” (Article 
ᇳᇺè Iᄭ Ɵǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿǀƞl iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ƾƿill ơƺƹƢǀơƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ. eƽiƞl 
cases are handled by the courts of first instance (Article 19). Their decisions 
can be taken to the court of appeal (Article 21). The appeal to and the pro-
ceedings of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court are regulated in the (separate) 
Federal Act of 17 June 2005 on the Federal Supreme Court. Part 2 also contains 
provisions on the cantonal/federal jurisdiction (Articles 22 et seqq.), recusal 
(Articles 56 et seqq.), or disciplinary measures (Article 64) as well as general 
procedural rules (oral and public proceedings, language, written records, ser-
vice of decisions, time limits, and file management). 
Part 3 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇲᇶᅬᇳᇵᇺᄭ ƢƣƤiƹƣƾ ƿƩƣ parties and the other persons invol-
ved in the proceedings (witnesses, experts, defence counsels, etc.). The par-
ties are the accused, the private claimant and the prosecutor (Article 104). 
The accused is a person suspected, accused of or charged with an offence 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳᇳᄭ. eƩƣ accused is the technical term used for the defendant. The 
private claimant is a harmed person who voluntarily participates in the cri-
minal proceedings (Article 118). There are three categories of harmed per-
sons: (1) the aggrieved: a person whose rights have been directly violated by 
the criminal offence (Article 115), e.g. a defrauded person; (2) the victim: an 
aggrieved person whose bodily, sexual or psychological integrity was direc-
tly affected by the criminal offence (Article 116), for example a person raped 
ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾlǄ iƹjǀƽƣƢ; ᄬᇵᄭ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ: ƟƺƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƨƽiƣǁƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ 
and the victim can declare that they want to participate as a private claimant 
iƹ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳᇻᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƸƣƽƣlǄ ƞƹ ƞơơƣƾ-
sory participant to the proceedings but a party on equal standing with the 
accused. Private claimants have access to the files, can participate in hea-
rings with the accused, appoint their own legal adviser, or request that evi-
Ƣƣƹơƣ Ɵƣ ƿƞkƣƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇲᇹᄭ. eƩƣǄ ơƞƹ Ƥilƣ ƿƩƣiƽ ơiǁil ơlƞiƸƾ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl 
proceedings (Article 122). They even have a say in the prosecution and  con-
ǁiơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿ ᄬ“ơƽiƸiƹƞl ơlƞiƸ”, éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇻ II liƿ. ƞᄭ. Fƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣǄ 
could request that specific charges be pursued: the parents in the case of the 
teenagers killed in the deadly car race discussed in the chapter on criminal 
law could have requested that the defendants be charged with intentional 
killing (Article 111 Criminal Code) rather than negligent killing (Article 117 
Criminal Code). 
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Figure 2: Categories of Harmed Persons
The prosecution only becomes a party to proceedings at the eventual court 
hearing. During the preliminary phase, the prosecution is the head of procee-
dings (Article 61 lit. a). This shifting of roles from the head of the proceedings 
into a party to the proceedings is a particularity of the prosecutorial system. 
Iƹ ƾƺƸƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣǁiƺǀƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƾǄƾƿƣƸƾ, ƞƹ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ Ƹƞƨiƾƿƽƞƿƣ ǂƞƾ 
in charge of the preliminary proceedings and the prosecution was a party 
throughout the preliminary and principal proceedings. 
Part 4 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇻᅬᇳᇻᇷᄭ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl CƺƢƣ ƺƤ CƽiƸiƹƞl aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ ơƺƹƿ-
ains the rules on evidence. Criminal justice authorities can rely on any lawful 
ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƢƣƣƸƣƢ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣ ƿƩƣ ƿƽǀƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇻᄭ. EǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƾƩƞll 
not be taken in relation to facts which are insignificant, obvious, well known 
to the criminal justice authorities, or which have already been sufficiently 
ƻƽƺǁƣƹ iƹ lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇻ IIᄭ. eƩƣ ‘ƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿlǄ ƻƽƺǁƣƹ’ ơlƞǀƾƣ iƾ ƻƽƺƟlƣƸƞƿiơ. Iƿ 
allows criminal justice authorities to engage in a so-called anticipated assess-
ment of evidence. For example, prosecutors or judges can refuse a request to 
hear a witness for the defence at any time if they have already decided on the 
Ƥƞơƿƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥilƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇺ IIᄭ. eƩiƾ Ƹƞkƣƾ iƿ ƸǀơƩ ƩƞƽƢƣƽ Ƥƺƽ 
the defence to tell their side of the story and could potentially conflict with 
éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. Ƣ ECHc ǂƩiơƩ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿ’ƾ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ “ƣǃƞƸiƹƣ 
or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
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Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇵ: cƺlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ aƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ aƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnes-
ses against him.” However, in this regard it should be noted that generally the 
European Court of Human Rights leaves it to the national courts to assess the 
relevance of the evidence which defendants request to bring forth.18
Parties have certain rights regarding the taking of evidence under Part 4. Most 
importantly, they have the right to be present when evidence is taken (Article 
ᇳᇶᇹ Iᄭ. aƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ơƺ-ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿƾ ơƞƹ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣ iƹ ƣǁƣƽǄ Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ ƺƤ 
the accused,19 and vice versa. This rule was meant to enforce the participatory 
rights of the parties. There are however practical problems to be solved: what 
if 250 persons have been defrauded in a Ponzi scheme and all of them want to 
participate in the interrogation of the accused? Or what if co-defendants attend 
the hearing of the accused, then adjust their own statements to avoid criminal 
liability? Thus, the Supreme Court has allowed for some narrow exceptions to 
the right to participation.20 These restrictions do not apply to the defence coun-
18 eƩƣ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƞiƸ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. Ƣ ECHc iƾ ƿƺ ƣƹƾǀƽƣ Ƥǀll “ƣƼǀƞliƿǄ ƺƤ ƞƽƸƾ” ƽƞƿƩƣƽ 
than mandating the examination of every witness on the defendant’s behalf (Perna v. 
IƿƞlǄ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇶᇺᇺᇻᇺ/ᇻᇻ, ECƿHc, ᇸ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇴᇻᄭ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ǂƩƣƹ ƞ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƟǄ 
a defendant to examine witnesses is sufficiently reasoned, not vexatious, relevant to the 
subject matter of the accusation, and could potentially have strengthened the accused’s 
position, relevant reasons for dismissing such a request must be given by the authorities 
ᄬaƺlǄƞkƺǁ ǁ. cǀƾƾiƞ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇹᇹᇲᇳᇺ/ᇲᇳ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇻ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇵᇶᅬᇵᇷᄭ.
19 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇹ I ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƻƽƺƾ-
ecutor and the courts take evidence and to put questions to the persons being questioned. 
20 dƣƣ BGE ᇳᇵᇻ Ig ᇴᇷ: ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂiƿƩ Ƹƺƽƣ ƿƩƞƹ ƺƹƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ, ƿƩƣ 
accused person may be excluded from participating in the questioning of the co-accused 
where there is a concrete risk of collusion. However, a mere abstract danger of collusion 
Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ jǀƾƿiƤǄ ƿƩƣ ƣǃơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƹƨ. dƣƣ ƞlƾƺ BGE ᇳᇶᇲ Ig 
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sel’s presence in police examination hearings: he or she may always be present 
ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ǁƣƽǄ Ɵƣƨiƹƹiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷᇻ IIᄭ.
aƞƽƿ ᇶ ƞlƾƺ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽ ƿƞkiƹƨ ƺƤ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ. Iƿ iƾ ƻƽƺƩiƟi-
ted to obtain evidence through coercion, violence, threats, promises, decep-
tion or through any measures that interfere with a person’s freedom of will 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ Iᄭ. Hƣƹơƣ, ƹƣiƿƩƣƽ Ƣƽǀƨƾ ƹƺƽ ƻƺlǄƨƽƞƻƩƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƣƽƣƢ, ƹƺƿ 
ƣǁƣƹ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ơƺƹƾƣƹƿƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣiƽ ǀƾƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ IIᄭ. 
Regarding the exclusion of evidence, Article 141 sets out three pivotal rules 
in this area. Firstly, evidence obtained through coercion (torture etc.) is stric-
tly iƹƞƢƸiƾƾiƟlƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ Iᄭ, ƞƾ iƾ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƺƢƣ ƺƤ CƽiƸiƹƞl 
Procedure explicitly declares to be inadmissible. For example, statements 
given by the accused without a prior caution of his or her right to remain silent 
ƞƽƣ ƢƣơlƞƽƣƢ iƹƞƢƸiƾƾiƟlƣ ƟǄ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷᇺ II. dƣơƺƹƢlǄ, ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƺƟƿƞiƹƣƢ iƹ ƞ 
criminal manner or in violation of rules protecting the validity of the evidence 
shall not be used, unless its use is essential to prosecuting serious criminal 
ƺƤƤƣƹơƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIᄭ. IƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ Ƥƺƽƨƣ ƞ ƾƣƞƽơƩ ǂƞƽƽƞƹƿ, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, ƿƩƣƹ 
any evidence obtained during the search would have been obtained in a crimi-
nal manner, as forgery of a document by a public official is a criminal offence 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇹ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. ‘gƞliƢiƿǄ ƽǀlƣƾ’ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƾiƨƹƣƢ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƤǀƹƢƞ-
mental rights of the accused: if a witness is not cautioned to tell the truth, 
for example, then “the examination hearing is invalid” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇹᇹ Iᄭ. dǀơƩ ƣǁi-
dence is generally inadmissible, unless, as stated above, it is needed to secure 
the conviction of a serious crime. Courts having to review such evidence must 
conduct a balancing exercise:21 the private interests of the accused have to be 
172: this case established that the right of accused persons to participate in evidence-
gathering does not apply to separate proceedings against other accused persons (where 
the other accused persons were involved in the same criminal incident but are being 
tried wholly separately as opposed to as a co-accused).
21 Strangely, the fact that the evidence could have been obtained legally is viewed to be an 
ƞƽƨǀƸƣƹƿ iƹ Ƥƞǁƺǀƽ ƺƤ iƿƾ ƞƢƸiƾƾiƟiliƿǄ. IƹƞƢƸiƾƾiƟiliƿǄ ǂƺǀlƢ, Ʃƺǂƣǁƣƽ, Ɵƣ ƞ Ƥƞƽ Ƹƺƽƣ lƺ-
gical sanction: if evidence can be obtained lawfully then it should be obtained lawfully. 
See the same argument in the context of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine by Jآ؛ء 
D. Jؔؖ؞ئآء/dؔإؔ؛ J. dبؠؠؘإئ, eƩƣ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ CƽiƸiƹƞl EǁiƢƣƹơƣ, BƣǄƺƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, Cambridge 2012, pp. 191 (“Clearly, it could equally 
be argued that the fruit of the poisonous tree ought not be relied upon as evidence in such 
circumstances precisely because the authorities could have obtained the evidence lawfully.”). 
The test formally required by the Supreme Court jurisprudence of whether evidence could 
have been legally obtained did not make it into the new Code and can henceforth be 
disregarded. 
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weighed against the public interest in finding the truth and securing a convic-
tion for the relevant crime. The graver the alleged crime, the more the public 
interest will prevail.22 Finally, evidence “obtained in violation of administrative 
rules shall be usable” ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIIᄭ. ‘éƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƽǀlƣƾ’ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƾiƨƹƣƢ ƿƺ 
guarantee the smooth administration of criminal proceedings. Their viola-
tion has no consequence. The provision on the search of mobile phones has 
- not very convincingly - been qualified as an administrative rule.ᇴᇵ
The Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure contains no statutory exclusion of 
hearsay evidence.24 Whilst Article 169 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code25 for-
bids such evidence, indirect evidence is admissible in criminal procedure and 
ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƞƾƾƣƾƾƣƢ ƤƽƣƣlǄ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl jǀƾƿiơƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲ IIᄭ.
Figure 4: Evidence Exclusion
22 BGE ᇳᇵᇲ I ᇳᇴᇸ.
ᇴᇵ BGE ᇳᇵᇻ Ig ᇳᇴᇺ.
24 dاؘؙؔء eإؘؖ؛ئؘ؟/dؔإؔ؛ J. dبؠؠؘإئ, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford 
ᇴᇲᇲᇸ, ƻ. ᇵᇴᇴ. 
25 Swiss Civil Procedure code of 19 December 2008 (Civil Procedure Code, CPC), SR 272; 
see for an English version of the Civil Procedure Code www.admin.ch (https://perma.
cc/99QZ-BZ8T). 
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The rules on evidence exclusion set out in Part 4 are unconvincing. One 
key concern is the fact that illegally obtained evidence can be used if a seri-
ƺǀƾ ơƽiƸƣ iƾ ƞƿ iƾƾǀƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIᄭ. Fƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ, ƿƩiƾ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ɵiƨ-
ger the crime he is accused of, the smaller his chances of a fair trial.26 This 
is problematic considering the possibility that severe sentences and thus a 
more severe deprivation of liberty will be imposed for more serious crimes; 
one would hope that in such cases, the trial and investigative process should 
be as fair and reliable as possible. Moreover, it is very hard in practice to draw 
a clear line between validity and administrative rules. This means that the 
defining of these terms is overly open to judicial discretion, leading to little 
protection for the accused. For example, the duty to obtain a search warrant 
has been viewed as an administrative rule in the past,27 even though house 
searches clearly involve a strong interference with the accused’s privacy inte-
rests. This demonstrates the ease of interpreting the category of rule (validity 
or administrative) to the detriment of the accused’s interests, and means the 
administrative rules lose their deterrent effect to an extent.28 
Part 5 (Articles 196–298d) determines the permissible coercive measures 
criminal justice authorities can resort to. Coercive measures are procedural 
actions of the criminal justice authorities which interfere with fundamen-
tal rights. They have multiple purposes, including: (a) to secure evidence 
ᄬƾƣƞƽơƩƣƾ ƺƤ ƻƽƣƸiƾƣƾ/ƽƣ ơƺƽƢƾ/ƻƣƽ ƾƺƹƾ, ƻƺƾƿ-ƸƺƽƿƣƸƾ, DNé ƞƹƞlǄƾiƾ, ƾƣi-
zure, covert surveillance of communication, of whereabouts and of banking 
connections, and undercover operations); (b) to ensure the presence of per-
sons in the proceedings (summons, arrest, detention on remand, bail) and 
(c) to ensure that the final decision can be enforced (seizure of assets, secu-
rity detention). Most of the coercive measures available under Part 5 can be 
ordered by the prosecution. Some measures that strongly interfere with fun-
damental rights have to be ordered by a judge at the “compulsory measures 
ơƺǀƽƿ”, Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, Ƣƣƿƣƹƿiƺƹ ƺƹ ƽƣƸƞƹƢ ƺƽ DNé Ƹƞƾƾ ƾơƽƣƣƹiƹƨ. dƺƸƣ Ƹƣƞ-
sures like surveillance of telecommunications or undercover operations must 
26 Mؔإؖ e؛آؠؠؘء/Mآ؝ؔء dؔؠؔؗ؜, The Bigger the Crime, the Smaller the Chance of a 
Fair Trial?, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 24 (2016), 
pp. 65, p. 65.
27 eƩƣ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣƾ ƺƤ ǀƹlƞǂƤǀl ƾƣƞƽơƩƣƾ ƞƽƣ ơƺƹƿƽƺǁƣƽƾiƞlèᅬ ƿƩƣ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƿƩǀƾ ƺƟƿƞiƹƣƢ 
has also been viewed as fully usable, see Judgement of the Federal Supreme Court BGE 
ᇻᇸ I ᇶᇵᇹ ᄬǁƺƹ Däƹikƣƹ ǁƣƽƾǀƾ ƿƩƣ Cƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ GƽƞǀƟüƹƢƣƹᄭ.
28 For a comprehensive overview of the debate over the admissibility of evidence, see 
e؛آؠؠؘء/dؔؠؔؗ؜.
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ƞƿ lƣƞƾƿ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻƽƺǁƣƢ ƽƣƿƽƺƞơƿiǁƣlǄ ƟǄ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ơƺǀƽƿ. IƹƿƣƽƣƾƿiƹƨlǄ, ƿƩƣ ƾƣƞƽơƩ ƺƤ 
premises, a very intrusive measure, can be ordered by the prosecution alone 
without any need for court approval. The only explanation for this is that the 
power to order searches has traditionally belonged to the prosecution. The 
prosecutor can also order the freezing of assets without judicial approval. 
However, the accused and other persons affected by the freezing can take the 
order to court. 
The remaining parts of the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure are less per-
tinent in the context of this chapter and as such will not be discussed in any 
depth. Part 6 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇴᇻᇻᅬᇵᇴᇹᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƻƽƺ-
ceedings (police inquiries, opening and dropping prosecutorial investiga-
tion, charges). Part 7 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇴᇺᅬᇵᇷᇳᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞl ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ 
at first instance (examination of the charge, hearing, taking of the evidence, 
pleadings, judgement) and Part 8 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇷᇴᅬᇵᇹᇺᄭ ƾƻƣơiƤiƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƻƣơiƞl ƻƽƺ-
ceedings available (summary penalty order, abridged and in absentia procee-
dings, proceedings in cases of insanity, non-conviction-based confiscation 
proceedings). Part 9 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇹᇻᅬᇶᇳᇷᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ lƣƨƞl ƽƣƸƣƢiƣƾ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ ƿƺ 
various parties (complaints, appeals, retrials). Part 10 ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇶᇳᇸᅬᇶᇵᇸᄭ ƽƣƨǀ-
lates the costs of the proceedings and compensation, while Part 11 (Articles 
ᇶᇵᇹᅬᇶᇶᇶᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣƾ ƺƤ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣƸƣƹƿ. FiƹƞllǄ, Part 12 (Articles 445–457) 
is the provision on the implementation of the Code.
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
Criminal procedures in Switzerland are constrained by a set of principles laid 
out by the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure. Firstly, the state has a monopoly 
on criminal justice (Article 2). Further, human dignity and fairness must be 
ƽƣƾƻƣơƿƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᄭ. CƽiƸiƹƞl jǀƾƿiơƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ ƺƹlǄ 
bound by the law (Article 4), and must investigate and proceed without undue 
delay (Article 5). According to the accusation principle, courts cannot start 
criminal proceedings themselves; charges have to be brought to them by the 
ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇻᄭ. Cƺǀƽƿƾ ƞƾƾƣƾƾ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ƤƽƣƣlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲ IIᄭ, ƹƺƿ Ƥƺllƺ-
wing specific rules but their ‘conviction intime’.29 Court hearings are public 
ƞƹƢ ǁƣƽƢiơƿƾ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƻƽƺƹƺǀƹơƣƢ ƻǀƟliơlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇸᇻᄭ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥƺllƺǂiƹƨ ƻƞƽƞ-
graphs, three other fundamental principles will be examined. 
ᇳ. Eث Oؙؙ؜ؖ؜آ Iءةؘئا؜ؚؔا؜آء
The Swiss criminal justice system is traditionally viewed as possessing an 
inquisitorial structure.ᇵᇲ The criminal justice authorities, i.e. the prosecu-
tion and the courts, cannot rely on the facts presented to them by the parties 
but have to inquire into the “material” truth ex officio. They have to investi-
gate exculpatory and incriminatory circumstances with equal care (Article 
ᇸ IIᄭ. hƩƣƿƩƣƽ iƿ iƾ ƾǀiƿƞƟlƣ ƿƺ Ƣƣlƣƨƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ƿƞƾk ƺƤ iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƹƨ ƣǃơǀlƻƞƿƺƽǄ 
evidence to the prosecution, whose institutional duty is to obtain as many 
29 Defined as the judge’s “inner or personal conviction” in Kؔإ؜ؠ é.é. K؛ؔء/Cؔإآ؟؜ءؘ 
Bب؜ئؠؔء/C؛إ؜ئ Gآئءؘ؟؟, aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ EǁiƢƣƹơƣ iƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl CƽiƸiƹƞl Jǀƾƿiơƣ, 
OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇳᇲ, ƻ. ᇵᇸ.
ᇵᇲ Critical on the inquisitorial- accusatorial divide: dؔإؔ؛ J. dبؠؠؘإئ, Fair Trials: the 
European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the European Court of Human Rights, 
OǃƤƺƽƢ ᇴᇲᇲᇹ, ƻƻ. ᇳᇹᇻ, ƾ.ƞ. ƻƻ. ᇵ ᄬ“The Enduring legacy of the Inquisitorial/Accusatorial 
Divide”); detailed criticism by Jؔؖؤبؘ؟؜ءؘ Hآؚؗئآء, French Criminal Justice: a 
CƺƸƻƞƽƞƿiǁƣ éơơƺǀƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ aƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ CƽiƸƣ iƹ Fƽƞƹơƣ OǃƤƺƽƢ 
2005, p. 241 (“GƩƽƢƵ)ƻƨƢƺƢ)ơƩƣƣƢƹƢƵƻ)ƻƨƢƶƹƢƻƩƠƞƳ)ƷƹƶƠƢơƼƹƞƳ)ƠƶƵƺƻƹƼƠƻƩƶƵƺ … Ʃƻ)ƟƢƠƶƴƢƺ)ƴƶƹƢ)
difficult to speak of ‘the trial’ in a way that makes sense across jurisdictions.”).
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convictions as possible, is a highly debated issue. The courts, on the other 
hand, preside over the parties. They are in a much better position to weigh 
arguments for and against the accused’s guilt. The problem with this is that 
this role is not properly exercised until the case comes to court; by this point, 
the accused may already be at a disadvantage because of the “cherry- picking” 
of evidence by the prosecutor. Due to the inquisitorial structure of the pro-
ceedings, witnesses in the Swiss system are questioned by the President of 
the court: they are not subjected to cross examination by the parties. Another 
much debated issue is, of course, whether criminal proceedings can ever actu-
ally be expected to reveal the “whole truth”. Apart from the epistemological 
dilemma that there is no objective truth untainted by subjective interpreta-
tion, criminal proceedings are also practically ill- suited to find the truth: the 
defendant may remain silent or even lie,ᇵᇳ and the criminal justice authorities 
only have limited means and resources available to them in order to investi-
gate the material facts.
ᇴ. Mؔءؗؔاآإج Iءةؘئا؜ؚؔا؜آء
eƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ kƹƺǂƹ ƺƽ ƾǀƾƻƣơƿƣƢ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƞơƿƾ iƾ ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇹᄭ. 
The rationale behind mandatory investigation is equality of treatment: no 
one shall escape criminal liability, regardless of personal characteristics or 
circumstances. However, there are certain minor offences that are prosecu-
ted only on complaint, e.g. acts of aggression (Article 126 Criminal Code), 
ơƺƸƸƺƹ ƞƾƾƞǀlƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇴᇵ I CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ, ƺƽ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƢƞƸƞƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇳᇶᇶ I CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. é ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƺƹlǄ ƿƞkƣƾ ƻlƞơƣ, iƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ǂƩƺ ǂƞƾ 
harmed requests that the person responsible be prosecuted by filing a comp-
lƞiƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲ I CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. fƹlƣƾƾ ƺƿƩƣƽǂiƾƣ iƹƢiơƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ dƻƣơiƤiơ 
Part of the Criminal Code, all offences are prosecuted ex officio. 
Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƺƹlǄ ǁƣƽǄ liƸiƿƣƢ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽiƞl Ƣiƾơƽƣƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƹƺƿ 
open an investigation or drop charges (Article 8). Prosecution can be discon-
tinued if defendants have already been severely affected by their actsᇵᇴ for 
example, this was the case where a defendant’s careless driving resulted in 
ᇵᇳ That an accused person may lie to the criminal justice authorities is not entirely uncon-
tested. Some authors suggest that in principle there is a right to lie; however this is lim-
iƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺƩiƟiƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ Ƥƞlƾƣ ƞơơǀƾƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇵ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. 
ᇵᇴ Article 54 Criminal Code: “Effect on the offender of his act - If the offender is so seriously 
affected by the immediate consequences of his act that a penalty would be inappropriate, 
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the death of her husband and grave injuries to her children.ᇵᇵ Charges can 
also be dropped if reparations are made to the victim for any losses.ᇵᇶ This 
exception is problematic because it conflicts with the equality of treatment 
rationale behind mandatory investigation: by allowing charges to be drop-
ped where reparations have been made, Switzerland makes an exception to 
criminal liability that is available only to those wealthy enough to properly 
compensate victims. 
Another part of the rationale behind obliging the prosecutor to pursue all 
charges was a concern to limit the arbitrational powers of the prosecution. 
This lack of prosecutorial discretion seems to leave very little room for plea 
bargaining. Prosecutors can, however, offer leniency in sentencing in exch-
ange for, for example, a confession.ᇵᇷ Such deals are often struck in abridged 
ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇷᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ.ᄭ. 
Of course, even though the prosecution is legally bound to investigate all 
crimes brought to their attention they can, de facto, refrain from opening an 
investigation. This is particularly possible in cases with no immediate victim 
party to the proceedings (for example, eco- crimes or drug- selling) as there is 
no one to contest the abandonment of the investigation.
ᇵ. Nؘؠآ eؘءؘابإ ئؘ Iأئبؠ Aؖؖبئؔإؘ
Nƺ Ƹƞƹ iƾ ƟƺǀƹƢ ƿƺ ƞơơǀƾƣ ƩiƸƾƣlƤ. eƩiƾ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ iƾ ƣƹƾƩƽiƹƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇵèI. 
Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽiǁilƣƨƣ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƾƣlƤ- iƹơƽiƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ ƣƹơƺƸƻƞƾƾƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƺƹlǄ 
a right to remain silent but also a right to refuse to co- operate with the crimi-
nal justice authorities. The accused cannot be obliged to actively hand over 
iƿƣƸƾ ƺƽ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ǂƩiơƩ ƞƽƣ ƢƣƸƞƹƢƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇸᇷ II liƿ.èƞᄭ. 
However, this does not give the accused the right to resist legal coercive mea-
sures. Thus, he or she must allow the criminal justice authorities to seize such 
the responsible authorities shall refrain from prosecuting him, bringing him to court or 
punishing him.”
ᇵᇵ BGE ᇳᇳᇻ Ig ᇴᇺᇲ.
ᇵᇶ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇵ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ: “Reparation; If the offender has made reparation for the loss, 
damage or injury or made every reasonable effort to right the wrong that he has caused, 
the competent authority shall refrain from prosecuting him, bringing him to court or pun-
ishing him if: a. the requirements for a suspended sentence (Art. 42) are fulfilled; and b. the 
interests of the general public and of the persons harmed in prosecution are negligible.”
ᇵᇷ A confession as to the facts suffices; there need not be a guilty plea in the strict sense of 
the term, i.e. a declaration of one’s own guilt.
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items or assets themselves. Obviously, the accused is protected from being 
forcefully coerced (for example, through torture) to provide evidence or to 
ơƺƹƤƣƾƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇲ Iᄭ. Oƹƣ ƞƽƣƞ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƸƺ- ƿƣƹƣƿǀƽ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ iƾ iƹ ƾƣǁƣƽƣ 
need of further implementation is in the auxiliary criminal law. For example, 
in Switzerland, citizens were under a legal obligation (backed up by fines) 
ƿƺ ơƺƺƻƣƽƞƿƣ iƹ ƿƞǃ ƣǁƞƾiƺƹ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ. Iƹ J.B. ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƞƻƻliơƞƹƿ 
had been fined CHF 4’000 under the administrative law for failing to provide 
information about his taxes. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
this provision violated the applicant’s right not to incriminate himself.ᇵᇸ Since 
this ruling, Switzerland has officially modified its tax legislation to align with 
the European Court of Human Rights case law.ᇵᇹ
ᇵᇸ J.B. ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇵᇳᇺᇴᇹ/ᇻᇸ, ECƿHc, ᇵ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇳ, ƞƿ ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇸᇵ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ. 
ᇵᇹ The new provision is Article 57a of the Tax Harmonisation Act of 14 December 1990, 
dcèᇸᇶᇴ.ᇳᇶ.
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III. Iƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ
The criminal justice institutions and procedure can best be understood when 
following the course of a standard case. A case involving a pensioner, a farmer 
and a herd of cows will be discussed to shine light on how the procedural 
rules actually work in practice. Following this, the extent to which the Swiss 
criminal procedural rules comply with requirements set by the Constitution 
and the ECHR will be examined, focusing on three key problem areas in this 
regard. 
On 17 June 2014, a farmer in the eastern Swiss mountains drove his cattle 
herd down from his alp. As he had done several times before, he passed in 
front of pensioner X’s house. The cows ate X’s grass and lavender and trampled 
over the meticulously groomed flowers. X, enraged, retrieved his revolver, 
aimed it at the cows and threatened to shoot them. 
On the same day, the farmer filed a complaint at the local police station. 
Whilst doing so, he himself was questioned by the police. The farmer’s filing 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ ƿƽiƨƨƣƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇲᇵᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽƣ-
liminary proceedings are divided up into two stages:ᇵᇺ the police inquiries 
and the investigation by the prosecutor (Article 299). The preliminary pro-
ceedings are led overall by the prosecution (Article 61 lit. a). The police are 
ƾǀƟjƣơƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƻƣƽǁiƾiƺƹ ƞƹƢ iƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷ IIᄭ. 
From the moment the complaint was filed by the farmer, X became “the accu-
sed” (Article 111). Through the filing of a complaint, the farmer automatically 
ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƿǀƾ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇺ IIᄭ. 
On the day after the incident, the prosecutor ordered a search of X’s house, 
ǂƩiơƩ lƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƾƣiǅǀƽƣ ƺƤ ƾƣǁƣƽƞl ƤiƽƣƞƽƸƾ ƞƹƢ ƞ Ɵƺǃ ƺƤ ƞƸƸǀƹiƿiƺƹ. Iƿ 
was during this search that X learned that a preliminary investigation had 
Ɵƣƣƹ ƺƻƣƹƣƢ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƩiƸ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇻᄭ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƽƣƞƿƣƹiƹƨ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇳᇺᇲ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ ƞƹƢ illƣƨƞl Ɵƣƞƽiƹƨ ƺƤ ƞ ǂƣƞƻƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵ I liƿ. ƞ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Weapons Act).ᇵᇻ i ǂƞƾ iƹƿƣƽƽƺƨƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇹ II ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇵᇺ See Figure 2, p. 404.
ᇵᇻ Federal Act on Weapons, Weapon Equipment and Ammunition of 20 June 1997 (Federal 
Weapons Act), SR 514.54.
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ᇵᇳᇴ Iᄭèᅬ Ʃƣ ƢƣƹiƣƢ ƿƩƣ ǀƾƣ ƺƤ ƞ ƤiƽƣƞƽƸ. Hƣ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƞ lƣƨƞl- 
aid defence counsel be appointed, if he had lacked the necessary finances 
to provide his own. However, a counsel would most probably not have been 
ƞƻƻƺiƹƿƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ, ƞƾ iƿ ǂƞƾ ƞ ƿƽiǁiƞl ƺƹƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇴᄭ. Iƹ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾ ơƞƾƣƾ, Ƥƺƽ 
example when the accused is facing a prison sentence of more than one year, 
a defence counsel must be appointed, even against the accused’s will (Article 
ᇳᇵᇲᄭ. Iƹ ƺǀƽ ơƞƾƣ, i ơƺǀlƢ ƞƿ ƞƹǄ ƿiƸƣ Ʃƞǁƣ ƩiƽƣƢ ƞ ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ƩiƸƾƣlƤ ƞƹƢ 
iƹƾiƾƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃƣ ƺƽ ƾƩƣ Ɵƣ ƻƽƣƾƣƹƿ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƻƺliơƣ iƹƼǀiƽǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇷᇻ IIᄭ.40 
eƩƣ ǂƽiƿƿƣƹ ƽƣơƺƽƢƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ iƹƼǀiƽǄ ǂƣƽƣ ƩƞƹƢƣƢ ƺǁƣƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ. IƤ 
the prosecutor had thought it necessary, he could then have interrogated the 
accused: this decision is entirely within the prosecutor’s discretion. During all 
interrogations the private claimant and his legal adviser could have participa-
ted both purely in presence and more actively by asking questions (Article 147 
I ƞƹƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇴ IIᄭ. EƼǀƞllǄ, ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƞƹƢ Ʃiƾ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƾƾiƾƿƣƢ 
in the prosecution’s interrogation of the private claimant and requested that 
additional questions be posed to him. 
When the prosecution considered the investigation to be complete, it had 
three possibilities: (1) to discontinue the proceedings and close the case, (2) 
ƿƺ Ɵƽiƹƨ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ ƺƽ ᄬᇵᄭè ƿƺ iƾƾǀƣ ƞ ƾǀƸƸƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƺƽƢƣƽ. Iƹ ƞƻƻƽƺǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ 
90 % of all cases that are not closed, the prosecution issues a penalty order. 
This is a judgment drafted by the prosecutor with a maximum sentence of six 
ƸƺƹƿƩƾ ƺƤ iƸƻƽiƾƺƹƸƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇴᄭ. Iƿ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ’ƾ ƾǀƸƸƞƽǄ 
ƞƾƾƣƾƾƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣiƽ lƣƨƞl iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ. Iƹ Ƥƞơƿ, 
if the defendant confesses to the police or if there is sufficient “objective” evi-
Ƣƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣƽƣ ƹƣƣƢ ƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ƞƹǄ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽiƞl iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ƞƿ ƞll ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇻ 
Igᄭ. Oƹ ᇻèdƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƾƣƽǁƣƢ iƿƾ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ i. Hƣ 
was found guilty of threatening behaviour and illegal bearing of a weapon 
ƞƹƢ ƾƣƹƿƣƹơƣƢ ƿƺ ᇻᇲ ǀƹiƿƾ ƺƤ ƸƺƹƣƿƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƞƿ CHF ᇵᇷᇲ.ᅬ ƣƞơƩ. eƩƣ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ 
was suspended with a probation period of two years. Further, he was senten-
ced to an unconditional fine of CHF 1’000–. The weapon was confiscated and 
the costs of the proceedings were imposed on X.
Once the penalty order was issued, X had the choice to either accept it or to 
Ƥilƣ ƞƹ ƺƟjƣơƿiƺƹ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƣƹ ƢƞǄƾ. HƞƢ i ƞơơƣƻƿƣƢèᅬ ƞƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ ᇻᇲ % ƺƤ ƞll ƞơơǀ-
ƾƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹƾ Ƣƺèᅬ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƺƽƢƣƽ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ơƺƸƣ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹ, 
40 Nƺƿƣ ƿƩƞƿ ECƿHc ơƞƾƣ- lƞǂ ƾƿiƻǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƾ ƞ ƽǀlƣ, lƣƨƞl ƞƾƾiƾƿƞƹơƣ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣƢ 
from the moment the suspect is taken into custody “and not only while being questioned” 
ᄬDƞǄƞƹƞƹ ǁ. eǀƽkƣǄ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇹᇵᇹᇹ/ᇲᇵ, ECƿHc, ᇳᇵ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇵᇴᄭ.
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ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƞƹǄ jǀƢiơiƞl ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇶ IIIᄭ. Oƹ ᇳᇷ dƣƻƿƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, 
however, X objected. When an objection is filed the prosecutor hears the 
ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƩiƸƾƣlƤ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇷ Iᄭ. Iƹ ƸƞƹǄ ơƞƾƣƾ, ƿƩiƾ iƾ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƿiƸƣ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀ-
sed deals with the prosecutor in person. On 1 October 2014, X was questioned 
by the prosecutor in the presence of the farmer (the private claimant). 
The prosecutor then has to choose between upholding the penalty order, 
iƾƾǀiƹƨ ƞ ƹƣǂ ƺƹƣ, ơlƺƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣ iƹǁƣƾƿiƨƞƿiƺƹ ƺƽ Ɵƽiƹƨiƹƨ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ. Iƹ ƺǀƽ ơƞƾƣ 
the prosecutor decided to uphold the penalty order. On 14 October 2014, he 
transferred the case to court. The penalty order thus constituted the indict-
Ƹƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇷᇸ Iᄭ. 
With the indictment, the preliminary proceedings against X came to an 
ƣƹƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇳᇺ Iᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞl ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ Ƥiƽƾƿ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ 
were commenced. From that point onwards the court was in charge of the 
ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇴᇺ IIᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƞ Ƹƣƽƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲᇶ I liƿ. ơᄭ. eƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƞƢƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇴᇻ 
Iᄭ ƞƹƢ ƾơƩƣƢǀlƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻƞl Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇳᄭ. éƿ ƞƹǄ ƻƺiƹƿ, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ 
ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƾkƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƸƺƢiƤǄ ƺƽ ƞƸƣƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƽƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇵ 
Iᄭ. FƽƺƸ ᇳᇷ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, i ǂƞƾ ƨiǁƣƹ ƞơơƣƾƾ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƥilƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƣƹ ơƺƹƾƣơǀƿiǁƣ 
days. Both parties may then request that more evidence is taken, for example 
they may request that a particular witness be heard. The presiding judge deci-
Ƣƣƾ ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽ ƿƺ ƨƽƞƹƿ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ. é ƽƣƤǀƾƞl ơƞƹƹƺƿ Ɵƣ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇳᄭ. 
Oƹ ᇴᇹ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇳᇶ, i ƤilƣƢ ƞ Ƹƺƿiƺƹ ƿƺ ƿƞkƣ ƞƢƢiƿiƺƹƞl ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ. eƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ 
turned down this request, anticipating that this would not affect their con-
clusion on whether or not the revolver had been used, thereby engaging in an 
anticipated assessment of evidence.41 
Cƺǀƽƿƾ ƺƤ Ƥiƽƾƿ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ ƞƽƣ ǀƾǀƞllǄ ơƺƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƽƣƣ jǀƢƨƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƞ ơlƣƽk. IƤ 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ ƞƻƻliƣƾ Ƥƺƽ lƣƾƾ ƿƩƞƹ ƿǂƺ Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƺƤ iƸƻƽiƾƺƹƸƣƹƿèᅬ ƞƾ ƺơơǀƽƽƣƢ 
iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ƞƹƢ Ƹƺƾƿ ơƞƾƣƾ iƹ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣèᅬ ƿƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢ ƟǄ ƺƹlǄ 
ƺƹƣ jǀƢƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇻ IIᄭ. éƾ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ, ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƞǂ Ƣƺƣƾ ƹƺƿ ƻƽƺǁiƢƣ Ƥƺƽ jǀƽǄ 
trials, meaning trial by jury is a very rare occurrence in Switzerland. X’s case 
was assigned to Judge Fإؘؘؗإ؜؞ Mü؟؟ؘإ, district court of Toggenburg. 
The principal hearing took place on 14 January 2015. X was joined by his 
ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇸᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿiƺƹ Ʃƞƾ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ ƞƿ ơƺǀƽƿ iƤ iƿ Ʃƞƾ 
requested a prison sentence of more than one year or if the court orders its 
41 See Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court 6B_495/2016 of 16 February 2017, consider-
ƞƿiƺƹ ᇳ.ᇵ.ᇵ.
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ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇹᄭ. eƩƣ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƺƽƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ ƞƿ 
ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇵᇺᄭ. Iƹ i’ƾ ơƞƾƣ, ƟƺƿƩ ǂƣƽƣ ƺƽƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ ƞƻƻƣƞƽ ƞƿ 
court. The court hearing was public (Article 69). 
At court, it is only mandatory for the judge to interrogate the accused 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇳ IIIᄭ. aƽiǁƞƿƣ ơlƞiƸƞƹƿƾ, ǂiƿƹƣƾƾƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƣǃƻƣƽƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƩƣƞƽƢèᅬ ƿƩiƾ 
ǂill ƺơơǀƽ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ jǀƢƨƣ’ƾ Ƣiƾơƽƣƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇵᄭ. Fƺƽ ƞll Ƥƺǀƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣƸ, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ 
relies heavily on the written records of their prior interrogations conducted 
ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣliƸiƹƞƽǄ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇵᄭ. eƩƣƾƣ ƾƿƞƿƣƸƣƹƿƾ Ƣƺ ƹƺƿ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ Ɵƣ 
repeated at court. The hearings are conducted by the president of the court 
ƺƽ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ jǀƢƨƣ iƹ ơƩƞƽƨƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇳ Iᄭ. Hƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ơƽƺƾƾ- ƣǃƞƸiƹƞƿiƺƹ 
by the parties. The parties can submit additional questions to the president, 
who then decides whether or not to pose this question to the person inter-
ƽƺƨƞƿƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇳ IIᄭ. éƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƿƞkiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ, ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ƻlƣƞƢ iƹ 
the following order: prosecution, private claimant, the accused or his or her 
ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ ơƺǀƹƾƣl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇸᄭ. eƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ƞlǂƞǄƾ Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ lƞƾƿ ǂƺƽƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ 
ᇵᇶᇹᄭ, ƣƹƾǀƽiƹƨ Ʃƣ ƺƽ ƾƩƣ iƾ ƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƤǀllǄ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƢ ƿƺ ƞll ƞơơǀƾƞƿiƺƹƾ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞǁƣ 
been levelled against him or her. 
After the hearings, the court retires to deliberate in private. The clerk 
ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣƾ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƢƣliƟƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƞƾ ƞƹ ƞƢǁiƾƣƽ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇶᇺᄭ. eƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ Ʃƞƾ 
to reach its verdict by a simple majority in cases involving a panel of judges 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇷᇳᄭ. aƞƹƣlƾ ƺƤ jǀƢƨƣƾ ơƞƹ ơƺƹƾiƾƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƺƽ Ƥiǁƣ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ. OƹlǄ ƞ 
few cantons allow judges who disagreed with the verdict to write a dissenting 
opinion.42 Iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞƹ ƞơƼǀiƿƿƞl, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƨƽƞƹƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƞơƼǀiƿƿƣƢ 
person compensation and reparation, which is done by the court ex officio 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇴᇻᄭ. Iƹ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƞ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƽƿ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƾ ƿƩƣ 
sanction (penalty and/or measure)ᇶᇵ and imposes the costs of the proceedings 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹǁiơƿƣƢ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇶᇴᇸᄭ. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ i, JǀƢƨƣ Mü؟؟ؘإ rea-
ched his verdict on the day of the hearing. X was found guilty of threatening 
behaviour and illegal bearing of a weapon. He was sentenced to 40 units of 
ƸƺƹƣƿƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ƞƿ CHF ᇵᇷᇲ.ᅭƣƞơƩ. eƩƣ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǂƞƾ ƾǀƾƻƣƹƢƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
probation period set at two years. X’s revolver and ammunition were confisca-
ƿƣƢ. eƩƣ ơƺƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ᄬCHF ᇵ’ᇳᇷᇲ.ᅬᄭ ǂƣƽƣ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƹ i. 
Judge Mü؟؟ؘإ delivered his verdict publicly, giving his reasons in a brief oral 
statement (Article 84). Written reasoning of the judgment has to be provided 
42 dƣƣ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇵᇶ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹ ƺƤ gƞǀƢ.
ᇶᇵ For this dual system of sanctions see Chapter Criminal Law, pp. ᇵᇹᇹ.
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if a sentence of more than two years has been imposed, if a party requests it, 
or if a party lodges an appeal (Article 82). X appealed his conviction. Hence, 
written reasons had to be provided. 
eƩƣ jǀƢƨƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Ƥiƽƾƿ iƹƾƿƞƹơƣ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻƣƞlƣƢ ƟǄ ƞll ƻƞƽƿiƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇺᇳ ƣƿ 
ƾƣƼƼ.ᄭ. Oƹ ᇳᇸ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, i lƺƢƨƣƢ Ʃiƾ ƞƻƻƣƞl. eƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ dƿ.èGƞllƣƹ 
turned it down on 8 January 2016. X then took the appellate judgment to the 
Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne (Articles 78 et seqq. Federal Supreme 
Court Act).44 The Supreme Court decided that the cantonal court had applied 
the Criminal Code correctly. X’s property rights were infringed by the farmer. 
X was thus in a situation of necessity (Article 18 Criminal Code). However, 
the use of his revolver had been wholly disproportionate and therefore the 
justification of necessity did not apply. The Supreme Court further ruled that 
the anticipated assessment of the evidence had not been arbitrary. Thus, the 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ ƹƺƿ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. Iƿ ƽƣjƣơƿƣƢ i’ƾ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹƿ ƺƹ 
16 February 2017. The judgment of the cantonal court was upheld. 
Most provisions of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code are in line with the 
Constitution and the ECHR. Some individual provisions, however, need to be 
reconsidered. 
FiƽƾƿlǄ, ƿƩƣ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ ƺƤèƞƹƿiơiƻƞƿƣƢ ƞƾƾƣƾƾƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ iƾ ƻƽƺƟlƣƸƞƿiơ. Iƿ 
allows prosecutors to adhere to the police’s assessment of the facts and courts 
to take the prosecutor’s stand without the accused ever having a real chance 
to “tell his side of the story”, or have any substantial involvement in the pro-
cess.45 This state of affairs violates the right of the accused to be heard. 
A second problem is the fact that courts are currently not strictly bound by 
ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƽƨƣƾ ƟƽƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƣƸ. IƹƾƿƣƞƢ, ƿƩƣǄ ơƞƹ ƞƿ ƞƹǄ ƿiƸƣ ƞƾk ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƾƣơǀƿƺƽ 
to amend or change the indictment. This is problematic in terms of the sepa-
ration of the investigative and adjudicative powers;46 the court interferes with 
the investigative stage when they engage in this practice. Further, this power 
works to the detriment of the defence, for while the prosecutors are provided 
with an opportunity to amend a poor indictment, the defence does not get a 
second chance to amend poor pleadings. 
The third and possibly the most persistent problem is that of the summary 
penalty order proceedings. Although defendants can de iure take their order 
44 FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇳᇹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇷ, dc ᇳᇹᇵ.ᇳᇳᇲ. 
45 For the associated problems of this state of affairs, see pp. 404.
46 eƩƣ iƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ jǀƢiơiƞƽǄ iƾ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲ I Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ: “Any person 
whose case falls to be judicially decided has the right to have their case heard by a legally 
constituted, competent, independent and impartial court.”
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to court, in over 90 % of all cases they are de facto adjudicated by prosecu-
tors. Therefore, it should be mandatory for the prosecution to interrogate the 
accused in person before issuing a penal order. Currently, prosecutors are not 
even bound to open an investigation; they can issue a penalty order solely on 
ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺliơƣ ƽƣơƺƽƢ ƞƹƢ Ʃƞǁƣ iƿ ƾƣƽǁƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵᇲᇻ 
Igᄭ. Iƹ ƾǀơƩ ƞ ơƞƾƣ, iƿ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƣƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƢƢƽƣƾƾƣƣ lƣƞƽƹƾ ƞƟƺǀƿ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ 
her conviction or properly understands its dimensions. This is problematic in 
ƿƣƽƸƾ ƺƤ ECHc ơƺƸƻliƞƹơƣ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. ƞ ECHc ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀ-
sed be “ƩƵƣƶƹƴƢơ)ƷƹƶƴƷƻƳǀ … ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)ƵƞƻƼƹƢ)ƞƵơ)ƠƞƼƺƢ)ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)ƞƠƠƼƺƞƻƩƶƵ)ƞƧƞƩƵƺƻ)
him.”è47 Penalty orders are not explained to the accused in plain terms, nor are 
ƿƩƣǄ ƣǁƣƽ ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ. eƩiƾ lƞƿƿƣƽ iƾƾǀƣ ơlƣƞƽlǄ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ III liƿ. ƣ ECHc, 
which provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence must “have the 
free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the langu-
age used in court.”48 
A more fundamental concern about the summary penalty order must also 
be addressed. The overwhelming majority of all convictions are now handed 
down by prosecutors under the summary penalty order procedure: thus, Swiss 
criminal procedure needs a general overhaul. The procedural principles dis-
cussed above were all drawn up with the principal court proceedings in mind, 
and thus were not properly tailored to apply to special proceedings. However, 
today, the summary penalty order proceedings are no longer “special pro-
ceedings”:49 instead, they have become the true “principal proceedings”.50 
Therefore, Switzerland’s principles of modern criminal procedure should now 
be tailored to better address these summary proceedings, to ensure that the 
rights of the accused are always properly respected.
47 Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ, ƿƩƣ iƹƤƺƽƸƞƿiƺƹ Ƹǀƾƿ Ɵƣ ƞơƿǀƞllǄ ƽƣơƣiǁƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƞơơǀƾƣƢ; ƞ lƣƨƞl ƻƽƣ-
ƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƽƣơƣiƻƿ iƾ iƹƾǀƤƤiơiƣƹƿ ᄬC ǁ. IƿƞlǄ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇲᇺᇺᇻ/ᇺᇶ, ᇷᇸ Dc ᇶᇲᄭ. Iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ 
ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ iƹ Ƥƞơƿ ƞ ǁƣƽǄ ƟƽƺƞƢ ƻƽƣƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ. éƽƿiơlƣ ᇺᇺ Ig ƾƿƞƿƣƾ: “Decisions to take 
no proceedings and summary penalty orders are deemed to be served without publication 
being required.”
48 The ECHR provisions on the right to a fair trial are also applicable to the pre- trial pro-
ceedings; “CƢƹƻƞƩƵƳǀ) ƻƨƢ)ƷƹƩƴƞƹǀ)ƷƼƹƷƶƺƢ)ƶƣ)AƹƻƩƠƳƢ)6 … Ʃƺ) ƻƶ) ƢƵƺƼƹƢ)ƞ) ƣƞƩƹ) ƻƹƩƞƳ)Ɵǀ)ƞ) ‘ƻƹƩ-
ƟƼƵƞƳ’ … ƟƼƻ) Ʃƻ)ơƶƢƺ)Ƶƶƻ) ƣƶƳƳƶƾ)ƻƨƞƻ)AƹƻƩƠƳƢ)6)ƨƞƺ)Ƶƶ)ƞƷƷƳƩƠƞƻƩƶƵ) ƻƶ)ƷƹƢ-)ƻƹƩƞƳ)ƷƹƶƠƢƢơƩƵƧƺ” 
ᄬIƸƟƽiƺƾơiƞ ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇵᇻᇹᇴ/ᇺᇺ, ECƿHc ᇴᇶ NƺǁƣƸƟƣƽᇳᇻᇻᇵ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇵᇸ; 
aiƾƞƹƺ ǁ. IƿƞlǄ, éƻƻ Nƺ ᇵᇸᇹᇵᇴ/ᇻᇹ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇹ JǀlǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇲ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇴᇹ; ƢiƤƤ. eإؘؖ؛ئؘ؟/
dبؠؠؘإئ, ƻ. ᇵᇳ.
49 dƣƣ ƿiƿlƣ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇺ, éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇷᇴ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ., ᄬ“Part 8 Special Procedures, Chapter 1 Summary 
Penalty Order Procedure, Contravention Procedure”).
50 dƣƣ ƿiƿlƣ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇹ, éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇴᇺ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ., ᄬ“Title 7 Main Proceedings of First Instance”). 
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Ig. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ iƹ Lƞǀƾƞƹƹƣ iƾ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ’ƾ ƩiƨƩƣƾƿ ơƺǀƽƿ. Iƿƾ ƽƺlƣ 
in the field of criminal procedure has shifted considerably since the enact-
ment of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure in 2011. Before, the Supreme 
Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƞƢ jǀƽiƾƢiơƿiƺƹ ƺǁƣƽ ᇴᇸ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹƿ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƺƢƣƾ. Iƿƾ Ƹƞiƹ ƿƞƾk ǂƞƾ ƿƺ 
set up common minimal standards regarding the rights of different parties 
for all the different codes. Because these codes were issued by the cantons, 
the Supreme Court had the power to nullify them. For example, in 1976, the 
directive on the police prisons of the canton of Zurich was partly nullified. 
The rules had not allowed prisoners to use their bed during the day and only 
allowed prisoners a walk in the open air every third day; as such, they were 
found to violate fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.51 
NƺǂƞƢƞǄƾ, ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ iƾ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƞ federal code. Because the 
Federal Supreme Court is bound by the laws of the Federal Parliament (Article 
190 Constitution) it may not nullify provisions of the Swiss Code of Criminal 
aƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ, ƞƾ iƿ ơƺǀlƢ Ƣƺ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ǂiƿƩ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ơƺƢƣƾ. Iƿƾ Ƹƞiƹ 
task is therefore to guarantee a consistent application of the Federal Code of 
Criminal Procedure throughout the cantons of Switzerland. As the following 
cases will show, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
has an even greater influence in the field of criminal procedure than in that 
ƺƤ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ. Iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƿƩƣ dƿƽƞƾƟƺǀƽƨ ƽǀliƹƨƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ 
to liberty (Article 5 ECHR) and the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) have 
had a deep impact on the criminal procedure rules of various member states.
ᇳ. dؖ؛ؘء؞ ة. dت؜احؘإ؟ؔءؗ52
One earlier case that had a strong influence on the rules which apply today 
surrounding the exclusion of evidence was that of a؜ؘإإؘ dؖ؛ؘء؞. This case 
was decided years before the introduction of the Federal Criminal Code of 
51 BGE ᇳᇲᇴ Iƞ ᇴᇹᇻ.
52 Schenk v. Switzerland, App no 10862/84, ECtHR, 12 July 1988.
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Procedure, but the principles developed under this case are still followed in 
the procedural laws of Switzerland today. 
dؖ؛ؘء؞ was suspected of having hired a hitman to kill his wife. The hit-
man, instead of executing his mission, had secretly taped a phone conversa-
tion with dؖ؛ؘء؞ and handed it to the investigating authorities. The tape was 
subsequently used as the main (but not sole) piece of evidence in the eventual 
trial against dؖ؛ؘء؞, where he was convicted for attempted instigation to 
murder. Secretly recording an individual is a criminal offence in Switzerland 
under Article 179ter Criminal Code. The question for the Supreme Court, when 
it considered dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ case on appeal, was whether illegally obtained evi-
dence could be used in a criminal trial. The Federal Supreme Court, conside-
ring this issue, held: 
“Tƶ) ƠƶƵƠƳƼơƢ … ƻƨƞƻ) ƞƵǀ) ƢƽƩơƢƵƠƢ) ơƢƹƩƽƢơ) ƣƹƶƴ) ƼƵƞƼƻƨƶƹƩƺƢơ) ƻƞƷƷƩƵƧ) ƴƼƺƻ)
ƵƢƽƢƹ … ƟƢ)ƼƺƢơ) ƩƵ)ƢƽƩơƢƵƠƢ)ƾƶƼƳơ)ƟƢ)ƻƶ)ƞơƶƷƻ)ƻƶƶ)ơƶƧƴƞƻƩƠ)ƞ)ƷƶƺƩƻƩƶƵ)ƞƵơ)ƾƶƼƳơ)
ƶƣƻƢƵ)ƳƢƞơ)ƻƶ)ƞƟƺƼƹơ)ƹƢƺƼƳƻƺ … IƵ)ƺƼƠƨ)ƞ)ƠƞƺƢ)Ʃƻ)Ʃƺ)ƵƢƠƢƺƺƞƹǀ)ƻƶ)ƟƞƳƞƵƠƢ … ƻƨƢ)ƩƵƻƢƹƢƺƻ)
ƶƣ)ƻƨƢ)SƻƞƻƢ)ƩƵ)ƨƞƽƩƵƧ)ƞ)ƺƷƢƠƩƣƩƠ)ƺƼƺƷƩƠƩƶƵ)ƠƶƵƣƩƹƴƢơ … ƞƵơ … ƻƨƢ)ƳƢƧƩƻƩƴƞƻƢ)ƩƵƻƢƹƢƺƻ)
of the person concerned in the protection of his personal rights”.ᇷᇵ 
The Supreme Court considered in the case of dؖ؛ؘء؞ that the public inte-
rest in having the truth established overrode dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ privacy interests. 
Thus, they ultimately upheld his conviction for attempted instigation to mur-
der, although the evidence had been obtained in an illegal manner. dؖ؛ؘء؞ 
took his case to the European Court of Human Rights, requesting a decla-
ƽƞƿiƺƹ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃiƾ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƞ Ƥƞiƽ ƿƽiƞl ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇸ I ECHc ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ. 
However, after examining the trial process as a whole, the European Court of 
Human Rights concluded dؖ؛ؘء؞ had not been deprived of his right to a fair 
ƿƽiƞl. IƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ǂƩiơƩ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣƢ ƿƩiƾ ơƺƹơlǀƾiƺƹ ǂƣƽƣ ƿƩƣ 
fact that dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ defence rights had not been disregarded and that the tape 
had not been the only piece of evidence used to secure his conviction. 
dؖ؛ؘء؞ is the leading case on the exclusion of illegally gathered evidence. 
The Supreme Court, as quoted above, stated that when courts assess the 
admissibility of evidence they must weigh the public interest in truth- finding 
and securing a conviction for the relevant crime against the accused’s pri-
vacy rights. This balancing approach was approved by the European Court 
ᇷᇵ BGE ᇳᇲᇻ Iƞ ᇴᇶᇶ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ᇴƟ, ơiƿƣƢ iƹ dơƩƣƹk ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇲᇺᇸᇴ/ᇺᇶ, ECƿHc, 
ᇳᇴ JǀlǄ ᇳᇻᇺᇺ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩ ᇵᇲ.
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of Human Rights when they heard dؖ؛ؘء؞’ئ ơƞƾƣ. Iƿ ƞlƾƺ lƞƿƣƽ ƟƣơƞƸƣ ƾƿƞƿǀ-
tory law in Switzerland: as was discussed earlier in the discussion about Part 
4 of the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure rules on exclusion of evidence,54 
evidence gathered “in a criminal manner” is generally excluded, unless it is 
ƹƣƣƢƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾ ơƽiƸƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇶᇳ IIᄭ. CƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, illƣ-
gally obtained evidence can be used if a serious crime is at stake. The worrying 
implications of this provision were outlined earlier: it means that even when 
ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƞl ƽǀlƣƾ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƾƿèᅬ iƹ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾ ơƞƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾƾiƟi-
liƿǄ ƺƤ ƞ ƾƣǁƣƽƣ ƾƣƹƿƣƹơƣ Ɵƣiƹƨ iƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƞ ƤiƹƢiƹƨ ƺƤ ƨǀilƿèᅬ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƾƿill 
unlikely to be heeded. Further, it acts to remove any incentive the criminal 
justice authorities may have to comply with procedural rules.
ᇴ. Hبؘؕإ ة. dت؜احؘإ؟ؔءؗ55
Another case, decided in 1990, that had an influence on criminal procedural 
law was that of Huber v. Switzerland. Again, this case was decided before the 
enactment of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus dealt with a 
cantonal criminal procedure regulation. 
The facts of the case were that members of the “Hell’s Angels” gang were 
suspected of having brought German prostitutes to Zurich, and subsequently 
forcing them to marry Swiss nationals who received payments in turn. 
These women were then forced into prostitution in Switzerland. The District 
Attorney of Zurich believed that Jبااؔ Hبؘؕإ was one of these women. On 
ᇳᇳ éǀƨǀƾƿ ᇳᇻᇺᇵ, Ʃƣ ƼǀƣƾƿiƺƹƣƢ Ʃƣƽ ƞƾ ƞ ǂiƿƹƣƾƾ. dƩƣ ƞƢƸiƿƿƣƢ Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƞ liǁiƹƨ 
from prostitution but denied any ties to the “Hell’s Angels”. At the end of 
the hearing, the District Attorney remanded her in custody on suspicion of 
having given false evidence. She was not released until a further eight days 
had passed. The District Attorney then indicted her. At trial, her lawyer 
argued that there had been two key failures by the authorities to respect 
Hبؘؕإ’ئ rights; in particular those guaranteed by the ECHR. Firstly: “anyone 
ƾƨƶ)Ʃƺ)ơƢƻƞƩƵƢơ … ƴƼƺƻ)ƟƢ)ƟƹƶƼƧƨƻ)ƷƹƶƴƷƻƳǀ)ƟƢƣƶƹƢ)ƞ)jƼơƧƢ … TƨƩƺ)ƵƢƽƢƹ)ƨƞƷƷƢ-
ned in the present case.” Secondly, there was a lack of independence at issue: 
“the person who remanded the accused in custody, District Attorney J., is now 
also prosecutor.” 
54 See pp. 406.
55 HǀƟƣƽ ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇴᇹᇻᇶ/ᇺᇹ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇵ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ.
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Unlike the Swiss courts, the European Court of Human Rights shared the 
ǁiƣǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹơƣ lƞǂǄƣƽ, ơƺƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇷ III ECHc ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ǁiƺ-
lated. The District Attorney, who had ordered the detention of Hبؘؕإ on 
remand at the preliminary stage of the proceedings, had become party to the 
trial by taking on the role of the prosecution. He was thus no longer “inde-
pendent of the parties”56. Following this judgment, the canton of Zurich had 
to change its Code of Criminal Procedure, delegating the task of approving 
detention on remand to the President of the District Courts.57 Today, this task 
is vested in the “compulsory measures courts”.58
ᇵ. C؛ؔؠأ- Dآ؟؟آء59
A had been detained on remand on suspicion of large scale cocaine traffi-
cking, and was held for 478 days at the ‘Champ- Dollon’ detention facility near 
Geneva. For 199 days (157 of which were consecutive), he shared his three- 
Ƹƞƹ ơƣll ǂiƿƩ Ƥiǁƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ iƹƸƞƿƣƾ ᄬƿƩƣ ƾƻƞơƣ ƞƸƺǀƹƿƣƢ ƿƺ ᇵ.ᇺᇵƸᇴ ƻƣƽ ƻƣƽƾƺƹᄭ. 
Dǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƣƹƿiƽƣ ƻƣƽiƺƢ Ʃƣ ǂƞƾ ơƺƹƤiƹƣƢ ƿƺ Ʃiƾ ơƣll Ƥƺƽ ᇴᇵ Ʃƺǀƽƾ ƻƣƽ ƢƞǄ. 
A claimed that such conditions of detention were inhuman and degrading, 
ǀƹƢƣƽ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc. 
Iƹ iƿƾ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƽƣliƣƢ ƩƣƞǁilǄ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƽiƿƣ-
ƽiƞ ƾƣƿ ƺǀƿ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ. IƤ Ƣƣƿƞiƹƣƣƾ ƞƽƣ ơƺƹƤiƹƣƢ 
ƿƺ ƞ ƾƻƞơƣ ƺƤ lƣƾƾ ƿƩƞƹ ᇵƸᇴ ƻƣƽ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ, ƿƩƣ lƞơk ƺƤ ƾƻƞơƣ iƹ iƿƾƣlƤ ǂill ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿƣ 
ƞ ǁiƺlƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc. IƤ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ƾƻƞơƣ ƽƞƹƨƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ᇵᅬᇶƸᇴ ƻƣƽ ƻƣƽ-
son, other detention conditions are considered in order to establish whether 
ƿƩƣƽƣ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƞƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc ǁiƺlƞƿiƺƹ, ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ᄬƢƞǄᄭliƨƩƿ, ǁƣƹƿilƞƿiƺƹ, 
temperature, sanitary facilities, time spent outside of the cell, health condi-
tions (for example the prevalence of tuberculosis), the quality of nutrition, 
and the overall duration of the detention. 
The Federal Supreme Court held that the Champ- Dollon prison has been 
heavily over- crowded for many years. The sanitary facilities, ventilation, light, 
and nutrition were deemed to meet the minimal standards. However, the fact 
that A had been detained for 157 consecutive days in a heavily overcrowded 
56 HǀƟƣƽ ǁ. dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, éƻƻ ƹƺ ᇳᇴᇹᇻᇶ/ᇺᇹ, ECƿHc, ᇴᇵ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇲ, ƻƞƽƞƨƽƞƻƩƾ ᇶᇴ ƣƿ ƾƣƼƼ. 
57 Cantonal Act of 1 September 1991 for the amendment of the Cantonal Code of Criminal 
Procedure (OS 51/851 et seqq.), in force since 1 July 1992. 
58 éƽƿiơlƣ ᇴᇴᇲ I: “Remand begins when it is ordered by the compulsory measures court.”
59 Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court 6B_456/2015 of 21 March 2016
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cell with virtually no time outside this confinement led the court to declare 
that the conditions violated the national and inter- national rules on deten-
tion. Despite the successful outcome of this judgement for the applicant, 
there have since been numerous cases concerning the continuing severe over- 
crowding in Champ- Dollon, including a 2016 case where the Federal Supreme 
Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƣƣƿƣƹƿiƺƹ ƾƿƞƹƢƞƽƢƾ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƢ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ ECHc.60
ᇶ. Kإ؜ئاؔ؟؟ءؔؖ؛ا61
Iƹ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇳᇴ, ƞ dǂiƾƾ ơƞƾƣ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞƾ ơƺƸƣ ƿƺ Ɵƣ kƹƺǂƹ ƞƾ KƽiƾƿƞllƹƞơƩƿ ƾǀƽ-
faced.62 é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ Mü؟؟ؘإ, a local politician of the conservative Swiss 
People’s Party in Zurich, posted a series of tweets on the social media plat-
form “Twitter” which made derogatory comments against Muslims. The most 
infamous quote was: “MƞǀƟƢ)ƾƢ)ƵƢƢơ)ƞƵƶƻƨƢƹ)KƹƩƺƻƞƳƳƵƞƠƨƻ … ƻƨƩƺ)ƻƩƴƢ)ƣƶƹ)ƴƶƺ-
ques”. Iƹ ƿƩƣ ƞƤƿƣƽƸƞƿƩ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ ǂiƢƣlǄ ƻǀƟliơiƾƣƢ ƻƺƾƿ, Mü؟؟ؘإ had to resign 
from his party and leave political office. He lost his job as a credit analyst 
and was indicted and ultimately convicted for racial discrimination (Article 
261bis CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. Iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ ƞǁƺiƢ ƤǀƽƿƩƣƽ ƣǃƻƺƾǀƽƣ ƞƿ ƿƽiƞl, Mü؟؟ؘإ 
successfully demanded that the press coverage of the hearing be restricted. 
The District Judge of Uster in Zurich issued an order that forbade the media 
from publishing his name, picture, and any other personal details (age, resi-
dence, employer, and the web address of his blog). Anyone who contravened 
this order would be subject to a fine of CHF 1’000. Two journalists objected 
to this order and took a case all the way up to the Federal Supreme Court. 
They argued that the order infringed the freedom of the media (Article 17 
Constitution).
The Federal Supreme Court held that the freedom of the media is a pivotal 
part of free speech in a democratic society. Although trials are open to the 
60 See also the article ‘Prison overcrowding in Champ- Dollon: Federal Supreme Court 
judgements and an alarming medical study’ (Source: Humanrights.ch, 18 May 2016, 
Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇵikK- BkgGᄭ.
61 BGE ᇳᇶᇳ I ᇴᇳᇳ.
62 “Kristallnacht” refers to “the occasion of concerted violence by Nazis throughout Germany 
and Austria against Jews and their property on the night of 9–10 November 1938”. Iƿ’ƾ ƞ 
German word that translates literally “to ‘night of crystal’, referring to the broken glass 
produced by the smashing of shop windows” (source: Oxford Dictionary, https://perma.
ơơ/ᇴBᇹᇵ- EiMkᄭ.
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public, in practice not everybody is able to attend hearings. Therefore, the 
media has an essential role as a bridge of communication between the state 
and the general public. This information task can only be fulfilled if the media 
is not unjustifiably restricted in its reporting. Fundamental rights can only 
be restricted if: (1) there is a sufficient legal basis, (2) there is an overriding 
ƻǀƟliơ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿ ƞƹƢ ᄬᇵᄭ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞƿƣ. eƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ 
explicitly provides in this regard that the essence of fundamental rights is 
sacrosanct, emphasising the fact that restrictions of rights are not allowed 
liƨƩƿlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
The Supreme Court found that a sufficient legal basis for imposing pre-
ǁƣƹƿiǁƣ ƽƣƾƿƽiơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƢiƞ ǂƞƾ Ƹiƾƾiƹƨ. Iƹ Ƣƺiƹƨ ƾƺ, ƿƩƣǄ ƣǃƞƸiƹƣƢ 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇹᇲ III, ǂƩiơƩ ƾƿƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ơƞƹ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣ ƿƩƞƿ ƸƣƢiƞ ƽƣƻƺƽƿƾ ƺƤ Ʃƣƞ-
rings meet specific conditions. However, this rule only applies when the gene-
ral public is excluded from a trial: this was not the case here. The Court also 
found that there was no legal basis for this order in the cantonal laws. Thus, 
the order was found to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court failed to hold 
that the District Court’s decision had seriously violated the freedom of the 
media, thus reducing the impact of the Supreme Court ruling. Moreover, in 
this case the restrictions were unwarranted, for the defendant continues up 
to this day to behave in a contradictory manner to his supposed wish for total 
privacy; he consistently publishes posts under his full name, with pictures of 
himself included. By behaving as such, he seems to somewhat renounce his 
privacy rights.
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